5.1: Theories of Change, Problems of Power, and Collective Action
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\(\newcommand{\avec}{\mathbf a}\) \(\newcommand{\bvec}{\mathbf b}\) \(\newcommand{\cvec}{\mathbf c}\) \(\newcommand{\dvec}{\mathbf d}\) \(\newcommand{\dtil}{\widetilde{\mathbf d}}\) \(\newcommand{\evec}{\mathbf e}\) \(\newcommand{\fvec}{\mathbf f}\) \(\newcommand{\nvec}{\mathbf n}\) \(\newcommand{\pvec}{\mathbf p}\) \(\newcommand{\qvec}{\mathbf q}\) \(\newcommand{\svec}{\mathbf s}\) \(\newcommand{\tvec}{\mathbf t}\) \(\newcommand{\uvec}{\mathbf u}\) \(\newcommand{\vvec}{\mathbf v}\) \(\newcommand{\wvec}{\mathbf w}\) \(\newcommand{\xvec}{\mathbf x}\) \(\newcommand{\yvec}{\mathbf y}\) \(\newcommand{\zvec}{\mathbf z}\) \(\newcommand{\rvec}{\mathbf r}\) \(\newcommand{\mvec}{\mathbf m}\) \(\newcommand{\zerovec}{\mathbf 0}\) \(\newcommand{\onevec}{\mathbf 1}\) \(\newcommand{\real}{\mathbb R}\) \(\newcommand{\twovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\ctwovec}[2]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\threevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cthreevec}[3]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfourvec}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\fivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{r}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\cfivevec}[5]{\left[\begin{array}{c}#1 \\ #2 \\ #3 \\ #4 \\ #5 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\mattwo}[4]{\left[\begin{array}{rr}#1 \amp #2 \\ #3 \amp #4 \\ \end{array}\right]}\) \(\newcommand{\laspan}[1]{\text{Span}\{#1\}}\) \(\newcommand{\bcal}{\cal B}\) \(\newcommand{\ccal}{\cal C}\) \(\newcommand{\scal}{\cal S}\) \(\newcommand{\wcal}{\cal W}\) \(\newcommand{\ecal}{\cal E}\) \(\newcommand{\coords}[2]{\left\{#1\right\}_{#2}}\) \(\newcommand{\gray}[1]{\color{gray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\lgray}[1]{\color{lightgray}{#1}}\) \(\newcommand{\rank}{\operatorname{rank}}\) \(\newcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\col}{\text{Col}}\) \(\renewcommand{\row}{\text{Row}}\) \(\newcommand{\nul}{\text{Nul}}\) \(\newcommand{\var}{\text{Var}}\) \(\newcommand{\corr}{\text{corr}}\) \(\newcommand{\len}[1]{\left|#1\right|}\) \(\newcommand{\bbar}{\overline{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bhat}{\widehat{\bvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\bperp}{\bvec^\perp}\) \(\newcommand{\xhat}{\widehat{\xvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\vhat}{\widehat{\vvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\uhat}{\widehat{\uvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\what}{\widehat{\wvec}}\) \(\newcommand{\Sighat}{\widehat{\Sigma}}\) \(\newcommand{\lt}{<}\) \(\newcommand{\gt}{>}\) \(\newcommand{\amp}{&}\) \(\definecolor{fillinmathshade}{gray}{0.9}\)Why do we need collective action, anyway? Why don’t we let the scientists, policymakers, and business leaders solve the problem of climate change for us? There’s an important reason that we need collective action: it has to do with what some scholars call a theory of change. Our theories of change shape how we think we can create the change we need; as a result, they inform the actions we take.
Let’s start with a story that has nothing to do with politics or social movements, to explain what theories of change are. Imagine that you are taking a class and the professor changes the date of the exam at the last minute. You thought the exam was going to be 2 weeks away, and all of a sudden the professor tells you it is going to be next Thursday. Dismayed by the sudden change, maybe you and several of your classmates stand outside talking about the dilemma after class. You are all upset, but what can you do? People will have different ideas. “Let’s send the professor an email asking to stick with the original date.” “Oh no,” someone might say. “It’s much better to talk about this in person. Let’s go to office hours.” “But wait,” someone else might say. “If the professor thinks it’s only four of us who are upset, nothing will change. Should we send a note to the whole class to see how many other people agree with us?” “Nah,” the fourth person might say. “The professor was clear. Nothing we do can make a difference.” And so on. Each of these students has a theory of change in mind. The first student’s theory of change is, If I send an email, then the professor will respond. The second student’s theory of change is, If I only email, then the professor will not respond, but if I show up in person, then the professor cannot ignore me. The third student believes, If we show that we have a lot of support, then the professor will listen and things will change. The fourth student thinks, If we take action, then we will have no impact. Each of these students would take a different action based on a personal theory of change.
Of course, theories of change are not just for students trying to influence their professors. Whenever we try to solve problems, we are relying on some kind of theory of change. Whenever we create a solution, it’s based on a theory about how our actions will change a particular situation or address a particular problem—regardless of whether we pause to consciously reflect on that theory. Because climate change is a complex, multifaceted problem—some scholars call it a “wicked” problem—it is especially important to pause and examine the theories of change that underlie the solutions we’re pursuing.
What theories of change do we bring to the problem of climate change? For example, if we consider technological innovation a solution to climate change, then our theory of change treats it as a technical problem that we lack the expertise to solve at present. Our theory of change suggests that if we can only develop the right skills or technology, we’ll solve the problem.
Many problems have been solved through technology. For example, when polio was a rampant disease and a major societal problem, the solution was developing a new technology—a vaccine—that could eradicate polio. Sometimes the trick is developing a new technology that solves one problem without creating others. An example of this is the so-called hole in the ozone layer, a much-discussed environmental problem in the 1980s and 1990s. The “hole” was caused by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other chemicals used in refrigeration and air conditioning that thin or deplete the ozone layer that protects humans and other forms of life from harmful radiation. When scientists identified the problem, national and international leaders came together to solve it, signing the Montreal Protocol, an international agreement that phased out CFCs and similar chemicals, in 1987 (Chapters 10 and 15).
The Montreal Protocol is a strikingly successful example of turning scientific knowledge into effective global environmental policy, but it required a replacement for CFCs. The companies that dominated the refrigeration and air-conditioning industries insisted that hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) were the only feasible option. But HFCs, while safe for the ozone layer, are potent greenhouse gases and have made the climate change problem worse—they solved one problem at the expense of another. In response to this situation, German scientists and Greenpeace joined together to develop and promote new coolant technology using ozone-safe hydrocarbons, which have much less impact on climate change than HFCs. Their GreenFreeze refrigerators have captured a substantial share of the market around the world, though they have not yet succeeded in North America, where the major companies still sell refrigerators that use HFCs.
Similarly, we’ve developed a whole host of technologies that respond to the problem of climate change—from wind and solar power to electric vehicles and trains, from increasing the energy efficiency of buildings to reducing fossil fuel emissions from agriculture. In fact, we already have a great deal of the technological innovation that we need. Some scientists, such as Mark Jacobson and Mark Delucchi, have estimated that the developed world has the technology to be feasibly carbon neutral by 2050. The developing world can leapfrog many fossil fuel technologies by skipping over them and adopting renewable energy technologies directly.
But even though we have the technology, we are still not solving the problem of climate change. That suggests a flaw in our theory of change. Though climate change does require us to make deliberate choices about the technologies we use, maybe it is more than a technical problem that can be solved entirely through technological innovation.
Let’s explore some other theories of change. Often, people think climate change is an information problem—that is, people do not have the information they need to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In that case, our theory of change says that if only people had the right information, they would act to solve the problem of climate change.
Accurate information has, in fact, helped people solve a host of problems. One example has to do with the effort to reduce SIDS, or sudden infant death syndrome, in the mid-twentieth century. In the past, pediatricians used to tell parents to put their babies to sleep on their stomachs, because they thought that reduced spit up and helped the babies (and their parents!) sleep better. They discovered, though, that for very young babies, sleeping on their stomachs could contribute to SIDS because young babies did not have the neck control or muscles to be able to move their heads if their mouths and noses got buried in blankets or the mattress. They realized that if babies slept on their backs, they were much less likely to suffocate and, therefore, much more likely to survive. Pediatricians began a campaign—Back to Sleep—to tell parents to put their babies to sleep on their backs, reversing their previous recommendations. Once they sent this information out to the public, parents made different choices and began to put their babies to sleep on their backs. The data show that spreading this information significantly reduced rates of SIDS. In other words, SIDS is an example of a problem where people acted differently once they were given the information they needed.
Unfortunately, however, scholars have found that there is a gap between opinion and action when it comes to climate change. Even though more and more people understand that climate change is a problem and think that we should do something about it, there’s a big gap between those who believe that climate change is a problem and those who actually take action.
Misinformation exacerbates that gap. For example, because of misinformation about climate science, the public thinks that only about 55% of climate scientists agree that global warming is occurring, when in fact it’s 97% or more of climate scientists. Almost all climate scientists agree that the climate is changing because of greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities. But because of misinformation, 59% of Americans say that they’re still unsure about whether climate change is happening and whether humans are causing it, as Anthony Leiserowitz and colleagues at the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication have found.
If there’s so much misinformation out there, shouldn’t we correct that by giving people more of the accurate information? In fact, research on misinformation in politics has shown that confronting people who believe misinformation with more information is not always productive. When people believe that climate change is not real and you try to disprove their ideas with information and evidence, it usually does not persuade them. Instead, it often entrenches them in their original beliefs and makes it harder to change people’s minds. Sometimes, just trying to win the argument with the best data is not the best strategy.
Though there are some problems that we can solve simply by informing people, climate change does not seem to be one of those. People do not always perceive the information we give them in the way that we expect. And even those who know that climate change is a problem don’t always take action on it.
What about market solutions? Isn’t climate change really a problem for businesses to solve? What if we could convince all the corporations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions sharply? The theory of change underlying market solutions is that if we could only give people who run companies the right set of incentives to behave the way that we want them to behave, then we could solve the problem.
Indeed, many capable people have developed incentives for individuals, families, and businesses to take action on climate change. But even though incentive programs have been set up, they are not scaling up enough to address the problem effectively. For example, carbon pricing is an important solution that is often discussed, but as of 2015, the World Bank reported that only 12% of global greenhouse gases are subject to carbon pricing (Chapter 12).
When we put all of these theories of change together—science, technology, communications, markets—we have to confront a difficult question. Climate science, technological innovation, communicating accurate information, and economic incentives are all essential to tackling climate change, but they’re not solving the problem on their own. In particular, they are not yet transforming key behaviors by corporations, governments, and societies at the scale required to mitigate or slow climate change. So what else do we need?
That’s where collective action comes in. Collective action, of which social movements are one form, involves people coming together to transform society and is most useful when we’re trying to solve problems of power. More information, a better piece of technology, a catchier message, or more streamlined incentives won’t solve a problem of power on their own. We can define a problem of power as one where the people who are most directly affected don’t have the authority or ability to make the necessary change.
Ordinary people are being affected by climate change now. Those of us who are affected by climate change urgently need to protect the world that we and our children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren will live in—but we don’t have the authority or the power to make the changes we need on our own. It is true that individuals can reduce their carbon footprints through everyday choices, such as eating less meat, using less energy to heat or cool their homes, and biking, walking, or taking public transportation instead of driving. But individual action is not even close to enough: action on a much larger scale than anything you or I alone can do is required to solve the problem of climate change. Instead, those who have the power to change the structural drivers of our dependence on fossil fuels must act. Our national governments and international bodies must make decisions that set the world on a different course.
If people don’t have the power to make the change that they need, then how do they acquire that power? First, they have to consider what their resources are. A famous organizer named Saul Alinsky once said that when you’re trying to make political change, there are two sources of power: organized money and organized people. And if you’re not on the side of organized money, what you need is organized people.
Because climate change is a problem of power, we need to adjust our theory of change. Technological innovation, climate science, accurate information, and market mechanisms are essential but will not be enough on their own. Our theory of change also has to include some way of moving power. In other words, we have to get those in power to adopt all the climate change solutions that have already been developed—all the solutions outlined in this book—on a scale large enough to make a difference. Acquiring that power is what collective action and social movements do.
To address multidimensional societal problems like climate change that are in some part problems of power, where the people who need change the most don’t have the power to make it, bringing people together is necessary. Social movements are a way to do that. Social movements are a type of collective action in which the people who want change the most also work with others to acquire the resources they need to make the change that they want. The rest of this chapter will examine how leaders and ordinary people in social movements acquire the resources and power to make the change that they want.

