5.3: California Water Wars
The California Water Wars were a series of political conflicts between the city of Los Angeles and farmers and ranchers in the Owens Valley of Eastern California over water rights.
As Los Angeles expanded during the late 19th century, it began outgrowing its water supply. Between 1909 and 1928, Los Angeles grew from 61 square miles to over 440 square miles, and the population nearly tripled from 300,000 to over 1.2 million. Fred Eaton, the mayor of Los Angeles and William Mulholland, the Los Angeles Water Department Supervisor, encouraged a plan to redirect water from Owens Valley to Los Angeles via an aqueduct. Before construction could begin, the ownership of the water rights needed to be secured, which was the beginning of these conflicts over water.
Owens Valley Before the Water Wars
The Owens Valley is an arid valley along the Eastern Sierra that is located to the east of the Sierra Nevada, west of the White Mountains and Inyo Mountains, and north of the Mojave Desert. The mountain peaks on the West side (including Mount Whitney) reach above 14,000 feet (4,300 m) in elevation, while the floor of the Owens Valley is about 4,000 feet (1,200 m), making the valley the deepest in the United States, thus being greatly influenced by the rain shadow effect.
Found at the southern tip of the valley is Owens Lake, a desiccating Salt Lake that has been both naturally and anthropogenically drying up since the 1900s. During the Late Pleistocene, the lake was at its maximum covering 200 square miles in size (520 km2) and reaching a depth of 200 feet (61 m).
Between 1838 and 1902, the average rainfall near Owens Lake was less than 3” per year. As of 2023 it is just less than 6” per year.
Documentation published in 1906, seven years before the Los Angeles Aqueduct opened, stated, ‘during the last 10 years the surface of the lake lowered 16’, and in 1904 it lowered 2.5 feet alone’.
Due to the limited rain the valley, populated by Paiute natives in the early 1800s, used irrigation channels to grow crops. The valley's soil conditions are inferior to those on the west side of the Sierra Nevada range, and runoff from the surrounding mountains is absorbed into the arid desert ground. After the United States gained control of California in 1848, the first public land survey conducted by A.W. von Schmidt from 1855 to 1856 was an initial step in securing government control of the valley. Von Schmidt reported that the valley's soil was not good for agriculture except for the land near streams.
In 1861, Samuel Bishop and other ranchers started to raise cattle on the luxuriant grasses that grew in the Owens Valley. The ranchers came into conflict with the Paiutes over land and water use, and most of the Paiutes were driven away from the valley by the U.S. Army in 1863 during the Owens Valley Indian War.
Many settlers came to the area for the promise of riches from mining. The availability of water from the Owens River made farming and raising livestock attractive. The Homestead Act of 1862 gave pioneers five years to claim and take title of their land for a small filing fee and a charge of $1.25 per acre. The Homestead Act limited the land an individual could own to 160 acres to create small farms.
The amount of public land settled by the late 1870s and early 1880s was still relatively small; however, the Desert Land Act of 1877 allowed individuals to acquire more area, up to 640 acres (259.0 ha), in hopes of drawing more settlers by giving them enough land to make their settlement and land expenses worthwhile, but "included no residency requirements". By 1886, rapid acquisition of land had begun and by the mid-1890s, most of the land in the Owens Valley had been claimed.
Before the Los Angeles Aqueduct, most of the 200 miles (320 km) of canals and ditches that constituted the irrigation system in the Owens Valley were in the northern valley, while the southern region of the valley was mostly inhabited by people raising livestock. The irrigation systems were necessary as the amount of precipitation was not enough to sustain any form of agriculture unless it was alongside the tributaries of the Owens River.
Repurposing the canals and irrigation channels that the Paiute had originally created, as well as the addition by ditch companies, did not have adequate drainage and as a result oversaturated the soil to the point where crops could not be raised. The irrigation systems also limited the amount of water draining to the terminal Owens Lake. At the start of the 20th century, the northern part of the Owens Valley turned to growing strawberries, cantaloupes, grapes, 33,000 fruit bearing trees, over 40,000 grape vines, apple trees and grazing pastures
The Los Angeles Aqueduct
Frederick Eaton and William Mulholland were two of the more visible principals in the California water wars. They were friends, having worked together in the private Los Angeles Water Company in the 1880s. In 1886, Eaton became City Engineer and Mulholland became superintendent of the Water Company. In 1898, Eaton was elected mayor of Los Angeles and was instrumental in converting the Water Company to city control in 1902. When the company became the Los Angeles Water Department, Mulholland continued to be superintendent, due to his extensive knowledge of the water system.
Eaton and Mulholland had a vision of a Los Angeles that would become far larger than the Los Angeles of the start of the 20th century. The limiting factor of Los Angeles's growth was the water supply. "If you don't get the water, you won't need it," Mulholland famously remarked. Eaton and Mulholland realized that the Owens Valley had a large amount of runoff from the Sierra Nevada, and a gravity-fed aqueduct could deliver the Owens water to Los Angeles.
Obtaining Water Rights - 1902–1907
At the start of the 20th century, the United States Bureau of Reclamation, at the time known as the United States Reclamation Service, was planning on building an irrigation system to help the farmers of the Owens Valley, which would block Los Angeles from diverting the water.
From 1902 to 1905, Eaton used underhanded methods to obtain water rights and block the Bureau of Reclamation. The regional engineer of the Bureau, Joseph Lippincott, was a close associate of Eaton; Eaton was a nominal agent for the Bureau through Lippincott, so Eaton had access to inside information about water rights and could recommend actions to the Bureau that would be beneficial to Los Angeles. In return, while Lippincott was employed by the Bureau, he also served as a paid private consultant to Eaton, advising Los Angeles on how to best obtain water rights. In addition to, President Theodore Roosevelt determined the East flanks of the Sierra to be the National Forest, so that land could not be purchased for land rights.
To help acquire water rights in 1905, Eaton made high offers to purchase land in Owens Valley. Eaton's eagerness aroused suspicion in a few local Inyo County people. Eaton bought land as a private citizen, hoping to sell it back to Los Angeles at a tidy profit. Eaton claimed in an interview with the Los Angeles Express in 1905 that he turned over all his water rights to the City of Los Angeles without being paid for them, "except that I retained the cattle which I had been compelled to take in making the deals ... and mountain pastureland of no value except for grazing purposes". Eaton moved to the Owens Valley to become a cattle rancher on the land he purchased. Eaton always denied that he acted in a deceptive manner.
By 1907, Eaton was busy acquiring key water rights and traveling to Washington to meet with advisers of Theodore Roosevelt to convince them that the water of the Owens River would do more good flowing through faucets in Los Angeles than it would if used on Owens Valley fields and orchards.
The dispute over the Owens River water became a political dispute in Washington. Los Angeles needed rights of way across federal land to build the aqueduct. California Senator Frank Flint sponsored a bill to grant the rights of way, but Congressman Sylvester Smith of Inyo County opposed the bill. Smith argued that irrigating Southern California was not more valuable than irrigating Owens Valley. While a compromise was being negotiated, Flint appealed to President Roosevelt. Roosevelt met with Flint, Secretary of the Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock, Bureau of Forests Commissioner Gifford Pinchot, and Director of the Geological Survey Charles D. Walcott. In this meeting, Roosevelt decided in favor of Los Angeles.
The aqueduct was sold to the citizens of Los Angeles as vital to the growth of the city. Unknown to the public, the initial water would be used to irrigate the San Fernando Valley to the north, which was not at the time a part of the city. From a hydrological point of view, the San Fernando Valley was ideal: its aquifer could serve as free water storage without evaporation. One obstacle to the irrigation was the Los Angeles City Charter, which prohibited the sale, lease, or other use of the city's water without a two-thirds approval by the voters. This charter limitation would be avoided through the annexation of a large portion of the San Fernando Valley to the city. The annexation would also raise the debt limit of Los Angeles, which allowed the financing of the aqueduct.
The San Fernando land syndicate were a group of wealthy investors who bought up large tracts of land in the San Fernando Valley with secret inside information from Eaton. The syndicate included friends of Eaton, such as Harrison Gray Otis and Henry E. Huntington. This syndicate made substantial efforts to support passage of the bond issue that funded the aqueduct. These efforts are reported to have included the dumping of water from Los Angeles reservoirs into the sewers (thereby creating a false drought) and by publishing scare articles in the Los Angeles Times, which Otis published. Remi Nadeau, a historian, and author disputed that water was dumped from reservoirs, because the sewer system may not have been connected to the reservoirs. The syndicate did unify the business community behind the aqueduct, and its purchases were public by the time the vote on the aqueduct was taken.
Construction of the Aqueduct - 1908–1928
From 1907 through 1913, Mulholland directed the building of the aqueduct. The 233-mile (375 km) Los Angeles Aqueduct, inaugurated in November 1913, required more than 2,000 workers and the digging of 164 tunnels. Mulholland's granddaughter has stated that the complexity of the project was comparable to the building of the Panama Canal. Water from the Owens River reached a reservoir in the San Fernando Valley on November 5, 1913. At a ceremony that day, nearly 30,000 Angelinos showed up for this event, in fact, the Southern Pacific Rail offered round trip tickets to the event from Downtowns for $1. At this event, Mulholland spoke his famous words about this engineering feat: "There it is… Mr. Mayor, Take it."
After the aqueduct was completed in 1913, the San Fernando investors demanded so much water from the Owens Valley that it started to transform from "The Switzerland of California" into a desert. Mulholland was blocked from obtaining additional water from the Colorado River, so he decided to take all available water from the Owens Valley.
Want to learn more about the Los Angeles Aqueduct? Either scan the QR code or visit this link to see Professor Patrich share a rare piece of California history, an original souvenir bottle from the opening of the aqueduct. (Video length: 4min).
In 1923, farmers and ranchers formed an irrigation cooperative headed by Wilfred and Mark Watterson, owners of the Inyo County Bank. By exploiting the personal bitterness of some of the farmers, Los Angeles managed to acquire some of the key water rights of the cooperative. After these water rights were secured, inflows to Owens Lake were heavily diverted, which caused the lake to dry up by 1924.
By 1924, farmers and ranchers rebelled. A series of provocations by Mulholland were, in turn, followed by corresponding threats from local farmers, and the destruction of Los Angeles property. Finally, a group of armed ranchers seized the Alabama Gates and dynamited part of the system, letting water return to the Owens River.
Dynamite found during sabotage incidents of Owens Valley Aqueduct, circa 1924
In August 1927, when the conflict was at its height, the Inyo County bank collapsed, which massively undermined valley resistance. An audit revealed that there were shortages in both cash in the vault and amounts shown on the books. The Watterson brothers were indicted for embezzlement, then tried and convicted on thirty-six counts. Since all local business had been transacted through their bank, the closure left merchants and customers with little more than the small amount of money they had on hand. The brothers claimed that the fraud was done for the good of the Owens Valley against Los Angeles, and this excuse was generally believed to be true in Inyo County. The collapse of the bank wiped out the lifetime savings of many people, including payments gained from the sale of homes and ranches to Los Angeles.
In the face of the collapse of resistance and of the Owens Valley economy, the attacks on the aqueduct ceased. The City of Los Angeles sponsored a series of repair and maintenance programs for aqueduct facilities that stimulated some local employment, and the Los Angeles water employees were paid a month in advance to bring some relief. But it was impossible to prevent many businesses from closing their doors due to the collapse of the bank.
The City of Los Angeles continued to purchase private land holdings and their water rights to meet the increasing demands. By 1928, Los Angeles owned 90 percent of the water in Owens Valley.
Case Study - The St. Francis Dam Failure
With the early success of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, Los Angeles experiencing a population boom. This influx of residents put immense strain on the city's existing water infrastructure. William Mulholland, the city's Chief Engineer, spearheaded the search for new water sources. He identified the San Francisquito Canyon as a potential location for a dam to capture water from the Los Angeles River tributaries.
Construction of the St. Francis Dam began in 1924 under the sole supervision of Mulholland and the Los Angeles Bureau of Waterworks & Supply. From the outset, the project was marred by critical flaws. Geologists warned of the site's instability – the underlying rock formations were a mix of weak sedimentary and fractured metamorphic rock, unsuitable for such a massive structure. However, Mulholland was advised to dismiss these concerns, to prioritizing speed, and cost-effectiveness over sound engineering practices.
The construction process itself was riddled with problems. To save time and money, substandard materials were used. In addition to, the Los Angeles Bureau of Waterworks and Supply ignored the recommendations of Mulholland to increase the volume of the water—without making additional adaptations to the dam’s structure. Cracks began appearing in the dam's structure as early as 1926, raising red flags about potential weaknesses. These concerns were also downplayed by Mulholland, who attributed the cracks to the "settling" of the concrete.
On the cold night of March 12, 1928, disaster struck. Just before midnight, the St. Francis Dam catastrophically failed. The 200-foot-tall structure crumbled, unleashing a torrent of water estimated at 12 billion gallons. This wall of water surged down the canyon at speeds exceeding 60 miles per hour (pushing a 6ft wall of water from the Dam site, along the Santa Clara River towards the Pacific Ocean in Ventura).
The consequences of the dam failure were horrific. The floodwaters roared through the valley, wiping out towns, farms, and infrastructure in its path. Over 55 miles of land were inundated, leaving a trail of destruction. Lives were tragically lost – estimates suggest over 431 people perished in the flood, many swept away in their sleep.
In the aftermath of the disaster, a state commission was established to investigate the St. Francis Dam failure. The commission concluded that the collapse was a direct result of a combination of factors: an unsuitable geological site, flawed design, poor construction practices, and a disregard for warnings and safety concerns.
The St. Francis Dam disaster remains a stark reminder of the importance of responsible engineering. The tragedy led to significant changes in dam safety regulations in California and across the United States. Today, rigorous geological surveys, robust engineering assessments, and stringent construction protocols are essential prerequisites for dam construction.